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Mechanical Copying, Copyright Law,
and the Teacher
Nancy Schuster* and Marc J. Bloch**
S UPPOSE PROFESSOR X, an enthusiastic teacher of American History and
government, has devised an exciting new plan for the teaching of
theories of government. He selects from the school library: a Jefferson
essay, with annotations, from a recently published anthology; a pamphlet
by Thomas Paine; a Walter Lippmann book; and a New York Times edi-
torial. From the six chapter pamphlet he reproduces four chapters; from
the book he copies one two-paragraph section verbatim and paraphrases
several ideas, acknowledging Mr. Lippmann as the author. He copies the
editorial and the annotated essay in full.
He duplicates the material on the school duplicating machine. He
distributes one copy to each member of his class, and one to a friend in
another district. The plan is so successful that it is discussed in a national
magazine. Professor X is ecstatic until he is served in three civil copy-
right infringement actions and threatened with a criminal charge under
Section 104 of the United States Copyright Act (Title 17 of the United
States Code).
But has he infringed? May a teacher copy for his class? If so, how
much and how many? The answer is neither evident nor simple.
He will defend as follows:
N.Y. Times v. X: Fair use, innocent intent.
Anthology v. X: Fair use, public domain.
Lippmann v. X: de minimis
U. S. v. X: No profit, innocent intent.
Whether he is successful may depend on the fate of S. 597 "A Bill for
the general Revision of the copyright law," now pending in the United
States Senate.
This article deals with the infringement problems encountered by
a teacher in duplicating copyrighted material for his class. Since the
teacher is the "real party in interest," we have attempted to avoid legal-
istic language (at least without explanation), so as to produce a paper
to which the layman, as well as the lawyer may turn for understanding.
We present first a definition of infringement, followed by the com-
mon law defenses available to Professor X since, at present, he has none
by statute.- We then discuss the attitude of the educator (made known
* B.S., Univ. of Wisconsin; fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
** B.A., Miami Univ. (Ohio); third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 As an "innocent" offender his present position in re: criminal charges is somewhat
better.
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through his lobby) to the new revision, what he hopes to gain, and his
rationale. To keep these arguments in perspective, we counter with the
views of the author whose rights X's compatriots wish to limit. An
examination of pertinent sections of S. 597 and the probable effect of its
passage concludes the article.
Infringement
The Federal Constitution invests Congress with the power "to pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times
to authors, the exclusive right to their . . . writings." (Emphasis added.) 2
"Copyright" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as an intangible right
granted to the author which invests him, for a certain limited time, with
"the sole and exclusive privilege of multiplying copies. . .. ," 3 (Emphasis
added.)
"Infringement" is defined by Black as a "breaking into; . . . or en-
croachment upon." 4 Thus copyright is actually infringed whenever the
sole right of the author to copy is broken into.
Defining the type of infringement which is actionable at law is not
so simple. The present statute5 makes no attempt at a definition and it
has been stated that the meaning is "presumed to be known to the law." 6
Corpus Juris Secundum attempts enlightenment with the statement
that infringement of copyright is the "doing, without the consent of the
owner, anything the sole right to do which is vested in such owner by
the common law .... ," 7 Accepting this definition, the questions become:
What are the "sole rights" vested and on what things do they settle, i.e.,
what is copyrightable?
Copyright is not available for an idea or plan, but only for the actual
embodiment, or expression, of the idea.8 The essence, however, is orig-
inality.9 It is not available for literature which is in the "public do-
main," 10 or for collections or representations unless the author can show
"originality" and "creativity." 11
The rights conferred by the copyright are to be exercised by the
2 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
3 Black's Law Dictionary 406 (4th ed. 1951).
4 Id. at 920.
5 Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. (1964).
6 Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 at 84 (6th Cir. 1943).
7 18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary Property § 15 (1955).
8 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
9 Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., supra note 6.
10 Christianson v. West Pub. Co., 149 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1945).
11 Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 1569 (1963).
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owner at his pleasure and for his own profit. 12 He has, in fact, a monopoly
on the printing, publishing, copying and vending of his works.
In 1914, in Macmillan Co. v. King, 13 the court found that mimeo-
graphing another's work and distributing it to a class was, by definition
copying and publishing, it was therefore, also by definition, an infringe-
ment.
According to the 1967 U.S. House of Representatives committee re-
port on the copyright law, the infringement takes place immediately upon
violation of any of the owner's rights, i.e. directly upon the printing, be-
fore any distribution.14 The taking does not have to be direct, a parody 15
or paraphrase 16 is sufficient.
Acknowledgment of the source,1 7 the absence of intent to in-
fringe,18 or lack of knowledge that the work was copyrighted 19 does not
vitiate an encroachment on the owner's monopoly.
The monopoly is limited only insofar as certain uses of copyrighted
works by others than the owner are considered fair. A "fair use" is not
an infringement of a published work. An unpublished work, however,
can never be used without the permission of the author.2 0 If S. 597 is
passed this common law anachronism will be abolished.2 1
One of the modern problems of infringement, especially for the
teacher, and the one with which this article attempts primarily to deal,
is mechanical copying. The photocopy machine has been called a "do-it-
yourself" tool for infringement 22 as it puts the means for infringement
within the reach of all.
12 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Copyright and Literary Property § 9 (1965).
13 223 F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914).
14 Hearings on S. 597 Before Subcomm. on the Copyright Law Revision of The
Senate, on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 8, pt. 4, at 1042 to 1048 (1967).
(Hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings.)
15 Marx v. U.S., 96 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1938).
16 Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (D.C. Pa. 1938),
here plaintiff sued to enjoin respondent from using a short medical statement in ad-
vertising; respondent merely paraphrased, the court found an infringement stating
that direct copying was not necessary to infringement.
'7 Goldman, The Copyright Law; Nearly Sixty Years Later, 28 Ohio St. L. J. 261
(1967).
18 See discussion of innocent intent infra.
19 American Press Ass'n. v. Daily Story Pub. Co., 120 F. 766 (7th Cir. 1902); appeal
dismissed, 24 S. Ct. 852 (1903).
20 Wilson, The Scholar and the Copyright Law, 10 ASCAP Copyright Law Sympo-
sium, 104 (1959).
21 See discussion of proposed revision infra.
22 Needham, Tape Recording, Photocopying, and Fair Use, 10 ASCAP Copyright
Symposium 75 (1959).
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De Minimis as a Defense to Copyright Infringement
De minimis non curat lex, "the law does not notice, or care for,
trifling matters" is a principle as old as the Common Law.
23
It is applied over the whole spectrum of the law24 to rid the courts
of those cases which have no place there. It is an affirmative defense, in
the nature of a confession or avoidance, which says, "I did what you
say, but it is so minor, that I have not in fact damaged you." In the
words of Judge Learned Hand: ". . . there comes a point where what
may be literally a wrong, is of too trifling importance to justify the inter-
vention of a court." 25
The question is, of course, how large is a trifle? In Toulmin v. Rike-
Kumler Co.,26 the court declared one and a half sentences chosen from
142 pages to be de minimis; in Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co.,27 three sentences from a text were termed "not so insub-
stantial as to be de minimis." It must be noted that defendant, Liggett
& Myers, used the copied material commercially to advertise its product,
cigarettes, while in the former case the plaintiff's book which had been
out of print for twenty-five years was printed in part in the preface of
a novel. Thus the size of a "trifle" may depend somewhat on circum-
stances such as the nature of the work involved, the purpose of the in-
fringement, and whether it might continue or happen again, i.e. whether
the court feels justice is to be done by leaving the parties as it finds
them.28
Our Professor X copied two paragraphs of the expert work of a
scholar. He copied, however, for the purpose of benefiting his class and
as a part of his job as teacher. X would seem to have a small psycho-
logical advantage over Mr. Lippmann who has not been truly damaged
and may, in fact, have benefited by the distribution of a small sample of
his wares. 29 The court must consider, however, that the copyright act
gives Mr. Lippmann a monopoly30 on the use of his book. Mr. Lippmann's
labor has produced this work and he should not be required to distribute
even a small part without compensation, or is this so small a part that it
could not matter? Does de minimis care that Defendant is a teacher?
Theoretically, no. But this is a question for the Court.3 '
23 Mayer's Appeal, 73 Pa. 164 (1873); 26A C.J.S. 175, n. 20 (1956).
24 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 69 F. Supp. 710 (D. Mich. 1947).
25 Condenser Corp. of America v. Micamold Radio Corp., 145 F.2d 878 at 880 (2nd
Cir., 1944), cert. denied 34 U.S. 861 (1945).
26 316 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1963).
27 Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 16 at 304.
28 Toulmin v. Rike-Kumler Co., supra note 26.
29 See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Mason, 201 F. 182 (C.C.N.Y. 1911).
30 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Copyright and Literary Property § 1 (1965).
31 Toulmin v. Rike-Kumler Co., supra note 26.
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Fair Use as a Defense to Copyright Infringement
Copyright, the handmaiden of censorship in Elizabethan England,
32
is again under attack as restricting the free flow of ideas. "Fair use," a
limitation on copyright recognized as early as the Eighteenth Century,
33
has recently, because of greater and greater demand for information, be-
come the cause celebre of Copyright Law.
The earliest cases which dealt with the subject were concerned with
abridgements rather than direct copies. In Gyles v. Wilcox, 34 Lord Har-
wicke found the question to be whether there was a verbatim taking
from the plaintiff's work or whether there was a "real and fair abridge-
ment of work." 35 The law in 1740 did not restrain persons from new
literary works any more than it does today.
But a colourable abridgement which is a work of scissors and paste
rather than of intelligent labor and literary skill is an infringement
of copyright. 36
Thirty years later, in Newberry's Case,37 the reporter recorded an
agreement with the earlier decision.
A true and proper abridgement, being the result of intelligent labor
and literary skill, condensing into a small compass the substance of
a comparatively large work by retrenching unnecessary and un-
interesting circumstances, and conveying the sense of fresh language,
is a new and meritorious work, and does not infringe the copyright
of the larger work.
Macklin v. Richardson,38 was another case of abridgement, but here
the defendant was found to have infringed the right of plaintiff by having
taken approximately one-half of the plaintiff's play, reproducing it in de-
fendant's magazine. The court stated that the question to be determined
was "what proportion the part published in the magazine bears to the
whole work out of which it was taken." 39
Thus the English Courts were forming the basic elements of "fair
use":
1) Extent of the material copied.
2) The value of that material to the new work.
The underlying question was: What influence will defendant's work
have commercially on that of the plaintiff?
32 Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright, 101-105 (1967).
33 Macklin v. Richardson, 27 Eng. Rep. 451 (1770); Newberry's Case, 98 Eng. Rep.
913 (1774); Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (1740); Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep.
139 (1785).
34 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (1740).
35 Id. at 489.
36 Gyles v. Wilcox, supra note 33.
37 Newberry's Case, supra note 33.
38 27 Eng. Rep. 451 (1770).
39 Id. at 452.
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In a landmark opinion, Lord Mansfield, the great Scottish jurist, set
down one of the basic precepts of the doctrine of fair use. Sayer v.
Moore40 was an action for infringement of maps and charts. The plaintiff
had prepared and published four sea charts. Defendant combined the
four maps into one and used additional information to prepare what he
believed to be a new document.
Lord Mansfield began his opinion with a now famous statement:
... We must take care to guard against two extremes equally preju-
dicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time
for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just
merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labor; the other, that
the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of
the arts be retarded.4
1
Thus was established the doctrine that it may be necessary to society
that in some situations persons be permitted to consult previous works
for use in a new and original work.42
Sixty years later Justice Story heard the landmark American case,
Folsom v. Marsh.4 3 Reverend Charles Upham had used 353 letters and
documents from Jared Sparks 7000 page, 12 volume work, Writings of
President Washington in an 866 page biography of Washington. The good
Mr. Sparks, somewhat distraught, asked the court for an injunction.
Justice Story was unable to accept the work of Upham as an abridge-
ment. He recognized, however, a need for leeway and that certain other
uses might be "fair."
... No one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely from
the original work, if his design be really and truly to use the pas-
sages for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. 44
But a work done with a view toward superseding or substituting for
the original would not be fair:
... If so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly
diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially to
an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient, in
point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto. The entirety of copy-
right is the property of the author; and it is no defense, that another
person has appropriated a part, and not the whole, of any property.
Neither does it necessarily depend upon the quantity taken, whether
it is an infringement of the copyright or not. It is often affected by
other considerations, the value of the materials taken, and the im-
portance of it to the sale of the original work .... We must ... look
to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which they may prej-
40 102 Eng. Rep. 139 (1785).
41 Id. at 140.
42 Id. at 140.
43 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
44 Id. at 344.
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udice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of
the original work.
45
Justice Story's test can be rather neatly divided into four parts:
1) The quality (value to the original) of the part taken;
2) The purpose of the taking;
3) The nature of the copyrighted work;
4) The effect on the market and objects of the original work.
These principles have remained nearly unchanged and are today, in
essence, the criteria of fair use. Thus the groundwork of Sec. 107 of the
1967 proposed copyright revision was laid before 1850.46
The Present Doctrine
This misty area of court-made law, tested by nuances of fact and
law, was called by Augustus Hand "... the most troublesome in the
whole law of copyrights." 47
Nevertheless, the doctrine of fair use is truly called a "rule of rea-
son" 48 by which the "promotion of science and useful arts" 49 can be the
result of copyright. If society is to benefit to the fullest extent, the
author's monopoly must be limited, sometimes Professor X must copy.
50
The present law makes no mention of fair use, although, as pointed
out, it was well known at the time of adoption. The method of limitation
and the criteria of enforcement have been left to the courts. Each case
rests on its own merits and is tested in light of the circumstances which
spawned it.51
Fair use, tremendously useful in matters concerning scholarly works
especially scientific, 52 legal,5 3 and historical, 54 has also been applied
to: 55
45 Id. at 348.
46 Id. at 348. See also H.R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
47 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939).
48 Lattman, Howell's Copyright Law (1962); Cooper, Use of Fair Use, 5 Publishing,
Entertainment, Advertising and Allied Fields, Law Quarterly, 509 (1965); Yankwich,
What is Fair Use?, 22 Chi. L. Rev. 203 (1954).
49 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
50 Shaw, Literary Property in the United States 81 (1950).
51 H.R. Rep. No. 14, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
52 Weatherby and Sons v. International Horse Agency and Exchange Ltd., 2 Ch. 297
(1910).
53 Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 F. 922 (2nd Cir. 1903).
54 Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921 (1963); Thompson v.
Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664
(7th Cir. 1950); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1898).
55 Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copy-
right Law 1961, 424. (Hereinafter cited as 1961 Report.)
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1. Quotations of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of
illustration or comment.56
2. Quotations of short passages in scholarly or technical works, for
illustration or clarification of the author's observations. 57
3. Use in parody, of some of the work parodied.58
4. Summary of an address or article, with brief quotations in a news
report.5
9
5. Reproductions by a library of a portion of work to replace part
of the damaged copy.
60
6. Reproduction by a teacher or a student of a small part of a work
to illustrate a lesson.6 1
7. Reproductions of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or
reports.62
8. Incidental and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broad-
cast of a work located at the scene of an event being reported. 3
Like "due care" the term defies definition.
64
Addenda to Fair Use
Fair use as it has been applied in the area of library copying must
be examined at this point. Most large modern libraries are well equipped
with the latest sophisticated copying equipment, generally at the disposal
of the copying public. 5
The needs of the scholar for ready access to research material and
the desire of the library to be able to keep their older works in repair,
prompted an effort to compromise their countervailing interests. As a
result, the Joint Committee on Materials for Research of the American
Council of Learned Societies, the Science Research Council and the Na-
56 H.R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
57 Folsom v. Marsh, supra note 43.
58 Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
See also Marx v. U.S., supra note 15.
59 Folsom v. Marsh, supra note 43.
60 Ginn and Co. v. Appollo Pub. Co., 215 F. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1914).
631 Folsom v. Marsh, supra note 43.
62 Holmes v. Hurst, supra note 54.
63 Folsom v. Marsh, supra note 43.
64 Hearings on H.R. 4347, Before the Subcommittee on the Copyright Law Revision
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. Ser. 8, pt. 1, at 53 (1965)
(hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings). Here speaking for the Copyright Office, Abe
Goldman confessed that there is a definition problem even for them.
65 Before the days of mechanical reproduction, scholars were permitted to copy by
hand for their own use. The thought was apparently that human endurance was
protection enough for the author.
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tional Association of Book Publishers have reached an accord known
euphemistically as the "Gentlemen's Agreement."
The Agreement provides, in substance, that libraries and similar
institutions, may make a single copy of part of a work for a scholar who
represents in writing that the copy is in lieu of a loan, in place of a man-
ual transcription, and is solely for purposes of research.
66
This joint, ad hoc action by two groups of diverse view, represents
formalized acceptance, albeit limited, of the concept of fair use. It is the
permit slip for the photocopy user in the library today, although the non-
profit aspect is missing in many cases.
In a 1953 article, Louis Smith acknowledged the forward step of the
Agreement, but lamented the fact that there are not sufficiently positive
guidelines to protect the librarians.6 7
The concept of fair use has been in the law in some form for over
two centuries, but except for the "Gentlemen's Agreement," it remains
unwritten in the United States. At Common Law, the position of the
doctrine is well established, nonetheless, those in education feel unsure
of their position.68
The British Exemption
In contrast, the United Kingdom, as early as 1911, provided by stat-
ute that fair dealing with any work "for the purpose of private study,
research, criticism or review . . . should not constitute an infringe-
ment." 69
In 1956 the law was revised and made more explicit. Sections 6 and
41 of the revised act specifically allow the inclusion of short passages
from a copyrighted work in a collection of non-copyrighted works in-
tended for school use.7" Interestingly, works published directly for
school use are excepted. Moreover, an author can take no more than
two excerpts from any one author in a five year period.71
Subsection I of Section 6 of the English statute allows for fair deal-
ing in research and private study, criticism, and review, as in the past.
66 Smith, The Copying of Literary Property in Library Collections, 46 Law Library
Journal 202-203 (1954). See also Hays, Fair Use: A Controversial Topic in the Latest
Revision of our Copyright Law 34 U. Cin. L. Rev. 73 (1965); H.R. Rep. No. 15, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1906).
67 Smith, supra note 66 at 202.
68 Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (C.C.N.Y. 1926); Rossiter v. Hall, 20 F. Cas. 1253
(No. 12,082) (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1866), supra note 50 at 52; Bishop, Fair Use of Copy-
righted Books, 2 Houston L. Rev. 206; Smith, supra note 102; see also 1965 Hearings
340-45.
69 James, Cowinger and Kowi, The Law of Copyrights 163 (1955).
70 See 36 Halsbury Statutes of England 81 (1956).
71 Id. at 135.
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Section 41 allows for school use of reproductions on exams, or for a
classroom otherwise than by the use of a duplicating process.
7 2
At this time no case has been reported under the new revision.
73
Innocent Intent
If innocent intent is relevant to copyright infringement, our Profes-
sor X might have no problem . . . IF.
Copyright infringement is held to be a tort.74 But is it an intentional
tort such as misrepresentation or an unintentional tort in the nature of
negligence? And if intent is an element, what intent is it, that completes
the tort of infringement?
75
A requirement of intent simply to copy would be met immediately
in most cases of teacher use. Such an intent surely exists in the mind of
the teacher who copies for his class. This is precisely what he is doing
and he will have infringed merely by doing it.
70
On the other hand, if the completing element is a specific intent to
infringe on the owner's copyright, the classroom teacher has only to show
that he copied with something resembling good faith and he is not
liable.7
7
The courts may hold him liable regardless, by presuming his mind
to hold an intent which it in fact does not. Such was the case in the
1869 decision of Lawrence v. Dana.78
Mere honest intention . . . will not suffice . . . he must be presumed
to intend all that the publication of his work (or his copying)
effects .... 79
This view in fact makes intent immaterial and has led to the recent
case of Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co.80 in which the Court stated in-
tent to be "immaterial if infringement appears." Perhaps infringement
of copyright is a tort of omission resembling negligence. Perhaps one
who copies, even in a classroom has not taken due care to avoid a harm
so that if plaintiff is injured by something defendant has done, the tort
is complete without any intent to harm and whether or not defendant
knew or had reason to know that he was copying.
72 Ibid.
73 The British Copyright Office has advised us that there have been no cases arising
under this act.
74 Leo Fiest, Inc. v. Young, 138 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1943); Turton v. U.S., 212 F.2d 354
(6th Cir. 1954).
75 Cain v. Universal Pictures Co. 47 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
76 Wihtol v. Crow, 199 F. Supp. 682 (D.C. Iowa 1961) rev'd 309 F.2d 999 (8th Cir.
1962).
77 Ibid.
78 Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (No. 8136) (C.C. Mass. 1869). Also Folsom v.
Marsh, supra note 43.
79 Ibid.
80 Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., supra note 54.
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Such is the present state of the case law.8 1 Thus the state of mind
of the infringer is no defense, per se. It is possibly an aid in obtaining
the sympathy of the court for a claim of de minimis and a great help
in fair use-but that is the extent of the worth of innocence to Professor
X and his fellow teachers.
Towards Revision:
The Educator v. the Author
The present state of the law, its advantages and disadvantages, can
be stated in two words: uncertain and flexible. These are, of course, the
result of each other, and all the effect connoted is the ground over which
rages the battle for statutory revision to affect the educator.
The storm, we feel, can best be viewed from its perimeter. For this
purpose, we have attempted to distill the arguments of each side, the
educators wanting specific and sure exemption,8 2 and the authors and
publishers afraid of their markets and satisfied with the law as it now is.
We include some arguments never stated, so far as we can discover,
by either side but implied in their positions.
The Arguments of the Educator Listed:
1. The U.S. Constitution authorizes copyright for the purpose of
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts. The intent is
to protect the property of the author only insofar as such protection
advances this purpose.8 3
2. Copyright is not a right, but a privilege, which can be limited
or removed for the benefit of society. Education of the young is in
the public interest.8 4
3. Classroom teachers, untrained in techniques of legal re-
search, need clear and readily discernible guidelines of permissible
copying. 5
4. The doctrine of fair use hides in a confused jumble of cases
which provide little notice for the trained attorney and none for
a lay teacher.86
5. The absence of statutory definition and the past reluctance of
authors to sue the educator have led the public to believe in the law-
fulness of copying. Teachers and members of the public are thus
81 H.R. Rep. No. 25, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. at 144 (1960).
82 The educators seem to recognize this as a "pie-in-the-sky" approach and will
settle, although not happily for a clearly set out and delineated "fair use." See also
1967 Hearings supra note 14 at 1042-46.
83 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8. See also 1965 Hearings supra note 64 at 341 and 1512.
84 Id. at 341-44.
85 Id. at 1573-74.
86 H.R. Rep. No. 83, supra note 56 at 30.
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subjected to the whim and caprice of the publisher and the author
who may, in fact, sue at any time.8 7
6. Since the concept of fair use is universally accepted as part
of the common law of copyright, it should be included in the statu-
tory definition.8 8
7. Proper teaching requires the use of numerous writings, often
on brief notice. Permission as a requisite to this use would inordi-
nately hamper the teaching process.8 9
8. It has long been common practice for the scholar to make
manual transcripts of published material. Photocopying is only the
modern form of handcopying.9 °
9. A teacher, having no intent to harm, should not be held
liable if he unwittingly infringes a copyright. 91
10. The market is not damaged, but improved by the use of ex-
cerpts in the classroom. Such excerpts whet, not satisfy, the appetite
of the student.
11. Teachers not permitted to copy will simply not use the ma-
terials and the market will be damaged.9 2
12. The publishing industry shows ever increasing profits in
spite of the alleged increased opportunity for infringement. 93
The Arguments of the Author and Publisher Listed:
1. The author has a property right which is deprived him by
the person who uses his work without permission.9 4
2. Any infringement of copyright takes profit from the author
and destroys his incentive to produce. The end result of an exemp-
tion to educators would be, therefore, a diminution of intellectual
production.9
5
3. The legitimate ends of education are well served by the doc-
trine of fair use which is implicit in the law and needs no further
recognition.96
87 1965 Hearings at 1498.
88 1965 Hearings at 317.
89 H.R. Rep. No. 15, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1960).
90 Id.
91 H.R. Rep. No. 25, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
92 1965 Hearings at 341-343.
93 1965 Hearings at 344.
94 Copyrights, 17 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1959).
95 Nimmer on Copyright § 145 at 653 (1967). See also 1965 Hearings 1809-21.
96 1965 Hearings at 1768.
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4. Publishers have historically refrained, without statutory
compulsion from action against teachers.
9 7
5. The teacher needs no protection beyond the existing sym-
pathy of the court.98
6. It is not fair to permit by statute what cannot be considered
a fair use.
7. Codification of common law fair use would solidify the out-
lines and restrict the margin for error currently allowed the user.
The present uncertainty provides a much needed flexibility. 99
8. Hand copying, although actually an infringement, has been
permitted because of the built-in limitation of human capacity.
There is no limit in the capacity of modern means of reproduction.'0
9. Specific statutory exemption for the educator opens the door
to other exemptions.
10. A blanket exemption, even in a small, well-defined area,
provides a niche which can become a canyon. Machinery for copy-
ing will be even more refined and accessible. The ultimate result of
an exemption is thus impossible to predict. 10 '
11. The contractor, plumber and hardware merchant are not
required to furnish their labor free to schools. Neither should the
intellectual producer.
12. The fact that a use is not for profit is immaterial.
13. The fact that there was no intent to infringe is immaterial
as intent is not an element of the tort of copyright infringement.
The Positions Weighed and Balanced
The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, which
enables Congress to grant copyrights, consists, say the educators, of two
distinct phrases: (1) The reason behind the clause, i.e.: promotion of the
arts and sciences; and (2) the grant itself, i.e.: The exclusive rights of
the author, for a limited time, to his writings. 0 2
The phrases are placed in the order of their importance and must be
interpreted in this light. So interpreted, continues the argument, the
thrust of the entire clause is the benefit to be derived by the public from
the promotion of the arts and sciences, in other words, education. We
97 Ibid.
98 Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 F. 922 (2nd Cir. 1903).
99 1965 Hearings at 1752-1770.
100 1965 Hearings at 1755-56.
101 See 1965 Hearings at 260-314. In 1909 jukeboxes were rare and 10 a play. Today
jukeboxes are part of a one billion dollar industry. Composers did not have to be
paid under the 1909 act for use of their works in jukeboxes, but feel today that they
are being deprived of their just due.
102 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8.
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have, then, a constitutional mandate to which the profit and right of the
author is only incidental. The author's purpose is to educate the public
and he may profit only insofar as this primary object is served. If it is
best served through a complete exemption for the educator, the author
may not complain. 0 3
But the author does complain. He cries that such an exemption does
not serve the public. That depriving him of his profit deprives him also
of his incentive and he will cease writing. There will then be no writings
with which to educate.
The right of the public to benefit from the advancement of science
must be balanced with the author's and publisher's right to benefit from
his intellectual property. This has been the purpose and function of fair
use as the common law knows it. According to Nimmer, the piecemeal
exploitation of copyrighted works by educators has gone beyond fair use,
and, in toto, becomes a serious infringement. 0 4 This area, continues the
argument, is undergoing a technological revision. Further, authorship is
a natural resource which must be preserved. 10 5
While teachers speak of a confused myriad of cases, there are, in
fact, only two cases which deal with a teacher's right to copy for his
class.' 0 6 This confusion is apparent, too, in library copying,107 for there
are no cases which discuss the now common practice of the library mak-
ing reproductions available to scholars.0 8 The confusion thus stems not
from a jumble of decisions but from a paucity."0 9 Thus the fears of edu-
cators are based on speculation, not law.
This fear prompts the educator to require guidelines which specifi-
cally spell out the number and length of permitted copying.
. . . Statutory fair use is not enough for education to do its job.
Fair use is not a sufficient guideline to the classroom teacher to
know when copyrighted materials may or may not be used. °10
Leaving fair use up to Court is not enough of a certainty for the
educators.
If all their copyright experts cannot agree on what is "fair use,"
how can anyone reasonably expect a third grade teacher in a rural
school to know? . . . and . . . how ... can one reasonably expect and
require all teachers to decide whether their contemplated lesson for
tomorrow is "fair use"?"'
103 1967 Hearings at 1054; 1965 Hearings at 1811.
104 Nimmer, op. cit. supra note 95 § 145 at 654.
105 H.R. Rep. No. 83, supra note 56 at 3.
106 Macmillan v. King, supra note 13; Wihtol v. Crow, supra note 76.
107 H.R. Rep. No. 83, supra note 56 at 31.
108 Nimmer, op. cit. supra note 95 at 652-53.
109 1965 Hearings at 1573-74.
110 Id. at 317.
111 Id. at 343-44.
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The educators' lobby was opposed to the 1965 proposed revision' 12
which recognized fair use in a single sentence 1 3 and are still not in
agreement on the new proposed revision." 4 This dispute was brought to
the fore when a House of Representatives subcommittee published its
comments. One statement especially repugnant to the educators was:
Where the unauthorized copying displaces what realistically might
have been a sale, no matter how minor the amount of money in-
volved, the interests of the copyright owner needs protection. 115
(Emphasis added.)
The Ad Hoc Committee has stated that if this statement is allowed
to remain, it will have no choice but to object to the report." 6
Fair use ... is not an "occasional" or only a "casual" use . . .it is a
fundamental statutory charter. There is nothing "occasional" or
"casual" about educations' right of fair use . . .it is constant ...
Anything less than language allowing educational copying is a per-
version of our agreement (the closed door compromise between the
two sides) and an automatic breach .... "I
The publishers, on the other hand, argue that fair use is well de-
fined, although each case must be decided on its own merits. Certainly
Folsom,"" Palmer-Bee,1 9 King,120 and the Crow Appeal,12 1 have defined
the doctrine of fair use well enough for the average man. Codification
is not needed since historically common law fair use has been sufficient
to protect the educator. 122 Furthermore, say the authors, the law in gen-
eral has been tolerant of the teacher's position. 123 This view, unfortu-
nately, is not borne out by the only two cases on point in which the pub-
lishers were favored by the court.1 24 Though when there has been a
minimal copying, de minimis and fair use are generally successful de-
fenses.
125
Thus far there have been no suits against persons not actively dis-
tributing the copy.
112 S. 597, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., § 107 (1967).
113 ". .. The fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement ..
114 1967 Hearings at 1045.
115 H.R. Rep. No. 83, supra note 56 at 35.
116 1967 Hearings at 1045.
117 Ibid.
118 Folsom v. Marsh, supra note 43.
119 Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., supra note 6.
120 Macmillan v. King, supra note 13.
121 Wihtol v. Crow, supra note 76.
122 1965 Hearings at 1768.
123 Ibid. See also Lattman, Howell, Copyright Law 135 (1962).
124 Macmillan v. King, supra note 13; Wihtol v. Crow, supra note 76.
125 Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Pa. 1914); H. A. Toulmin,
Jr. v. Rike-Kumler Co., supra note 26.
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Libraries have, for some seventy years, been making copies for pri-
vate use of scholars in lieu of their coming to the library and, to
date, not a single case can be cited in which a library was sued for
making copies.126
The teachers, however, feel the power of the author. There is, after
all, no assurance in past practice that the teacher will not be sued be-
cause of a small or undistributed copy. A specific exemption would cure
this doubt, the educators tell.
Without an automatic educational exemption . . . "fair use" might
well become a snare and a delusion to teachers. 127
It would also, answer the authors, lead to further encroachments on
their legitimate rights. They recognize that the present state of the law
works to their advantage. The uncertainty admittedly, say the authors,
limits the wondering educator and enforces that which has been termed
his "moral" obligation not to infringe.
After weighing both arguments, the House subcommittee reported
that:
After full consideration, the committee believes that a specific ex-
emption freeing certain reproductions of copyrighted works for edu-
cational and scholarly purposes from copyright control is not justi-
fied. . . . Any education uses that are fair use would be fair use
under the bill.128 (Emphasis added.)
Mechanical Reproduction as Fair Use
It is a mistaken belief of some 120 that the public has a right to copy.
During the Hearings, a copy machine manufacturer stated that mechan-
ical reproduction must be specifically mentioned in the proposed revision
in order to clear the confusion of private owners. He recommended that:
Fair use shall include the right to reproduce the copyrighted work
for personal or private use but not for sale. . . . Thousands . . .
of people have purchased copying machines and copy papers and
have also long used that equipment to make copies of copyrighted
material for their own use. Since no legal action has ever been
brought against anyone for engaging in . . . the practice (it) is per-
fectly lawful, and copyright owners have acquiesced. 130
While this is certainly the present situation, the authors could not
agree to give legislative sanction to it.
Irwin Karp, of the Authors League, in a report to the Committee
stated:
126 L. Hattery and G. Bush, Reprography and Copyright Law 95 (1964).
127 1965 Hearings at 344.
128 H.R. Rep. No. 83, supra note 56 at 31.
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The type of device used does not affect the making of unauthorized
copies; infringement is infringement whether it is by a letter-press,
an offset ... or by other means .... There is no case that says this,
but it is not even worth debating because of the vast differences in
nature, extent and effect between copying by hand and copying from
a machine. What the machines replace are not the pen, but the
printing press.131
George Cary, Deputy Registrar of Copyrights, stated the position of
his office as follows:
... Use of new devices for this purpose (copying) should be encour-
aged. It has already become clear, however, that the unrestrained
use of photocopying . .. and other devices for the reproduction of
author's works, going far beyond the recognized limits of fair use,
may severely curtail the copyright owner's market for his copies.
132
(Emphasis added.)
The conscientious teacher tends to use numerous writings from
various sources on brief notice. The educators argue that taking the time
to seek permission from the publisher will destroy the spontaneity which
is the very essence of good teaching practice. In fact, they go on, simply
because of the valid needs of teachers, there is a high correlation be-
tween good teaching and infringement.1 3
The publishers answer by saying that there always has been room
under the existing law for creative teaching, however when an entire
school or school district distributes such "off-the-cuff" copies, there is
a serious taking, and one which cannot be ignored. 13 4
The present revision considers the positions of both sides by appear-
ing to allow creative teachers to copy as long as the use is not substan-
tial."3r
The educators argue, with some supporting case law,1 6 that pub-
lishers who allow their works to go out of print for some time, showing
no intention to reprint the work, are in no position to restrict copying
for teaching.137
The publishers fear, however, that to allow the educator this privi-
lege, will destroy some of the economic incentives of writing and pub-
131 Id. at 1755 and 1765.
132 Id. at 33.
133 Id. at 317-19. See also Hattery, op. cit. supra note 126 at 4.
134 Nimmer, op. cit. supra note 95 at 654. See also 1967 Hearings at 1054 and 1965
Hearings at 1811.
135 H.R. Rep. No. 83, supra note 56 at 31 and 33.
136 Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co., supra note 125.
137 H.R. Rep. No. 83, supra note 56 at 14. See also Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-
Bee Co., supra note 119; Yankwich, "What is Fair Use?" 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203
(1954).
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lishing. 18s They fear that unregulated taking from out-of-print works will
lead to also taking from new works.
An author's income from any individual sale is "minor"; his royalty
is only a few cents. His compensations and reward for prolonged
work on a book comes from the accumulation of these minor amounts
of royalties and payments from individual sales, and uses of the
work. Consequently each unauthorized sale and each loss of "minor"
income, contributes to the process by which accumulation of un-
authorized copyings and resulting losses of sales, harm the author
and publisher. 139
They ask, what will prevent the educators from reproducing seg-
ments of works, both in print and out, and creating their own anthol-
ogies?
Nimmer, among others, has decried the tendency of the educator to
insist on the right to copy. Perhaps the educators imply, that they are
more interested in their own convenience than in promotion of the arts
and sciences. 1
40
In the main, educators are not willful infringers. If they infringe at
all, it is unwittingly. The educators thus argue that they should not be
liable as willful infringers.
We do not use copyright material for our own gain but rather for
the benefit of students for whom we are responsible.
1 41
The innocence of the defendant, however, serves to influence the jury
and mitigate damages. 142 The publishers reply again that they would be
economically harmed if teachers were absolved of all liability for in-
fringement. 143 S. 597 is a compromise which leans a bit, perhaps, toward
the educator.
Eight years ago, Borg-Warner, foreseeing the sheaves of testimony
to come, suggested that both sides sit down and try to work out a new
"Gentleman's Agreement." 144 But the lines were drawn and emotions
have run high through years of planning and testimony. While both sides
have tacitly agreed to some compromises, actually little has been accom-
plished in bringing them together.
We are not pretentious enough to suggest a better "mousetrap" but
it appears that only by continuing the dialogue between the poles can
138 1965 Hearings at 1811 and 39; 1967 Hearings at 1054.
139 1967 Hearings at 1150-51.
140 Nimmer, op. cit. supra note 95 at 652-53; 1965 Hearings at 1810.
141 1965 Hearings at 321.
142 18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary Property § 135 (1939).
143 1967 Hearings at 1052.
144 H.R. Rep. No. 25, supra note 91 at 61.
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anything lasting appear. Our proposal, which should be looked into
deeper, is the licensing system suggested by the authors.
1 45
If the law impedes and interferes with the procedures necessary to
accomplish the end that society seeks, it usually is amended, re-
scinded or, in those cases where the law protects one group to the
detriment of the legitimate rights of another group, the two groups
eventually work out a compromise which will serve and satisfy both
needs.146
1967 Revision Proposed
The whole system of copyright law in the United States, in the light
of interpretation by the courts, calls for a revision. The courts are more
and more called upon to consider these questions. And . . . the repro-
duction of various things which are the subject of copyright has enor-
mously increased. The wealth and business of the country and the means
of duplication have increased immeasurably. The law requires adaption
to these modern conditions. 47
So said an eminent attorney in the year 1909, so repeated an award
winning essay in 1958;148 so said the registrar of copyrights in 1961.149
Now in 1968, the United States Senate struggles with the third proposed
revision in three and one half years. 150
In 1955, preliminary to revising the copyright law, and at the in-
stance of Congress, the Library of Congress undertook a series of thirty-
four studies on the law of copyright as it appears in practice. The studies
culminated in a report by the Registrar of Copyrights' 5' and after numer-
ous meetings and discussions, H.R. 11947 was prepared and introduced
in 1964.152 H.R. 11947 died with the close of the 88th Congress and
emerged in 1965 with some important changes, 153 as H.R. 4347. Again
testimony was taken (this time some 1042 pages) and again the bill died
with the Congress, reappearing this time and with a particularly inter-
esting change, as H.R. 2512.
H.R. 2512 passed the House in April, 1967, and is at this writing,
145 1965 Hearings at 1811 and 1930. See also Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copy-
right 16 (1967).
146 Hattery, op. cit. supra note 126 at 3.
147 Address by Samuel J. Elder before the Maine St. Bar Ass'n. quoted in H.R. Rep.
No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
148 Needham, op. cit. supra note 22.
149 See 1961 Report at IX. "It seems unnecessary to dwell at length upon the changes
in technology in the last half century that have affected the copyright law. A large
body of judicial interpretation and business practice has grown up around the pres-
ent statute."
150 H.R. Rept. No. 83, supra note 56 at 2.
151 1961 Report.
152 1961 Report at 71.
153 Particularly, for all purposes, in Sec. 107, the "Fair Use" provision.
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pending (as S. 597) before the Subcommittee on Patents and Trademarks
and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.5 4 An addi-
tional 341 pages of testimony have been added to the record,15 5 but it is
unlikely that the bill will be reported out of committee before the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Fortnightly v. United Artists Television.15 6
How does S. 597 affect the ability of the classroom teacher to make
unauthorized copies of a work without incurring liability? Will Profes-
sor X fare better or worse if the bill is enacted into statute? Or will
there be no difference?
A user will not presumably be more certain of where he stands.
First he must determine whether the work he is considering falls into
one of the seven categories 157 listed in § 102 and therefore copyright-
able. Once decided, he has no problem, as he does under existing law,
of whether the item has been published, since published or not, all works
would henceforth be subject only to a Federal copyright. 15 The old com-
mon law copyright sprang up immediately, and automatically and with-
out limit, attached itself to unpublished copyrightable works. It re-
mained to protect them forever so long as they remained unpublished,
but fell away automatically at the moment of publication.
S. 597 abrogates the Common Law in this regard and substitutes a
single time-limiting system' 59 for the present "anachronistic, uncertain,
impractical and highly complicated dual system." 160 This change will be
especially helpful to the scholar dealing with historical papers.
There will still be the problem, however, of whether the work has
in fact been registered. Protection of the user is one of the purposes of
the requirement that notice be printed on the work. However, failure to
register a printed notice within five years of publication' 61 does not in
some cases abrogate protection. 1 62 The teacher cannot, then, rely on a
look at the work and is saved only by § 404 (b) which provides that a
person misled by lack of notice will not be liable.16
3
As does the present statute,'164 S. 597 grants to the author a number
of exclusive rights which are, together, the copyright.
154 H.R. Rep. 83, supra note 56.
155 1967 Hearings.
156 Fortnightly v. United Artists Television, 88 S. Ct. 589 (1968).
157 H.R. Rep. 83, supra note 56 at 102 (1967).
158 The statutory federal copyright (the common law counterpart) henceforth:
"subsists from creation" (the work) but is limited to the life of the author plus 50
years-published or not. See H.R. Rep. 83, supra note 56 at 302.
'59 S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301.
160 1961 Report at 96.
161 The word is equally hard to define in this context.
162 This seems to have been a concession to the authors and publishers. See H.R.
Rep. 83 supra note 56 at 110.
163 Whereby the statute avoids fastening a strict liability without fault on the user.
164 The author has the exclusive right to "print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the
copyrighted work." Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (a) (1964).
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These are the "exclusive rights to do and to authorize" the follow-
ing: 165
1) Reproduction in copies or records. 166
2) Derivative works (such as ballet, pantomime, condensation, 1
67
abridgement, dramatization).
3) Distribution (by sale, transfer, rental, loan).168
4) Public performance (reading, singing, dancing or acting out).169
5) Display (showing a copy including film of performance).170
Impingement on any of these rights (except where they are limited
by the statute) will be an actionable infringement. The Legislature has
made its intent eminently clear: The making of a copy is alone an in-
fringement which needs no distribution to complete it.
171
The effect is somewhat mitigated by the Committee's reminder that
infringement still requires reproduction in whole "or in any substantial
part." 172 (Emphasis added.)
Comments on the Proposed New Statute
The Courts have come, through the years, to accept essentially four
tests as guidelines for the determination of whether a use is fair: 173
1) The size, and relative importance of the part used in relation to
itself and the copyrighted work (extent).
2) The nature of the copyrighted work (nature).
3) The users reason for using the work (purpose).
4) The competition of the use with the copyrighted work and the
author's market (competition).
These standards were set out in the 1964 bill, eliminated in 1965 and
re-established in the present bill.1 74 They are presented as a "gauge for
balancing the equities." This gauge can be considered a victory for the
165 S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1967).
166 H.R. Rep. No. 83, supra note 56 at 24.
167 Id. at 27.
168 Id. at 28.
169 1-3 describe together the author's right to copy, record, excerpt and publish.
170 H.R. Rep. No. 83, supra note 56 at 23.
171 Compare older common law view requiring publication (distribution) for com-
pletion of the tort.
172 H.R. Rep. No. 83, supra note 56 at 24.
173 See Ringer and Gitlin, Copyrights 20 (1965).
174 S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1967). "The factors . . .include (but are not
limited to):
(Continued on next page)
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teachers who claimed that the vague statement of H.R. 4347, that "fair
use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of copyright," left them
in the woods without a guide.1 75 The authors too can chalk up a win
having avoided the complete statutory exemption claimed by the teachers
as a necessary gate post.
What is it that the teachers have won? The committee states clearly
that it has "no purpose of either freezing or changing the doctrine of the
common law." 116 But can this be accomplished? It seems that the mere
act of putting words into legislative form gives them a pre-eminence
they lacked before. The court may make law where there is none-but
where the law is set forth by legislation, it must be followed. The com-
mittee disclaimer notwithstanding, the gauge will be frozen into law.
The greatest risk is that the criteria will become more important
than the result. The court may become so concerned with meeting the
proper tests that it will forget the ultimate question: Is this use fair? 177
Is the committee's wish to provide the educator due notice, pushing copy-
right into a dilemma from which the law of conflicts is struggling to re-
move itself? 178
§ 107 is the first of a group of four limitations carved out of the ex-
clusive rights granted by § 106. § 107 of the revision states that a copy
can be a fair use. It sets out a list of the type of uses upon which the
legislature looks with favor 179 and lists the criteria of fair use. It does
not, as already pointed out, grant anything for sure.8 0
The teacher who copies is theoretically aided, in addition, by
§ 504C(2) which deals with "the special situation of teachers who repro-
duce copyrighted material for classroom use in the honest belief that
what they are doing constitutes fair use." 1l The committee assumes the
average classroom teacher has heard of fair use and read § 107. The
(Continued from preceding page)
1. The purpose and character of the use
2. The nature of the copyrighted work
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work."
175 H.R. Rep. No. 83, supra note 56 at 27.
176 Id. at 31.
177 John Schulman has developed a simple and true test: "When clients ask ...
whether they may use this or that material I ask them a preliminary question,
namely, how would you feel if somebody did that to you? It is a pretty good test."
1965 Hearings at 1714.
178 See Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws (1959).
179 Criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship and research.
180 S. 597, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. § 108 (1967), grants libraries the specific right to copy
for deposit and § 110 specifically exempts "performance or display (not copying) ...
by instructors or pupils in face to face teaching ... ." (Emphasis added.)
181 H.R. Rep. No. 83, supra note 56 at 130.
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burden, the comment and the statute tell us, is on the teacher, to prove
that "he believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that the re-
production was a fair use under Section 107." 182
May the teacher then, if he is aware of the terms of the statute, look
to the naked statute to find fair use-or must he look to the cases behind
it? The comment has stated the section to be merely declarative of the
common law. Knowledge of that law is then necessary to interpretation.
Is he then in any better position than he was before? And how much of
a basis makes a belief reasonable? One criteria fulfilled? Two?
No one to our knowledge has said so, but the 1964 case of Wihtol v.
Crow'8 3 may be the enveloping darkness which caused the teachers to
feel so strongly a need not yet quite evident. 84 Defendant Crow, a music
teacher and choir director,' 5 arranged one of plaintiff composer's songs
for his school choir. This he duplicated on the school copy machine and
distributed one copy to each member of his class. The arrangement was
performed publicly and was such a success defendant decided to offer it
to plaintiff. Plaintiff sued. Defendant Crow pleaded fair use and that
plaintiff had only taken a folk song already in the public domain.
The district court was singularly unimpressed by "the sincerity of
plaintiff's testimony" 1s6 and his "indefensible" attempt to frighten Crow
(on a groundless threat of criminal prosecution) into conceding dam-
ages.' 87 The court, emphasizing the fact "that defendant had no thought
of financial gain" 188 said:
The crucial issue, however, is whether the sum total of defend-
ant Crow's actions in experimenting with the copyrighted song,
drawing a new arrangement and testing (it) . . . constituted such un-
fair use of plaintiff's work as to amount to infringement .... 8 9
Citing Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co.'90 the court reasoned:
... subsequent workers in the same field (should not be) deprived
of all use.., as... the progress of science and the useful arts would
be unduly obstructed.
182 Id. at 131.
183 Wihtol v. Crow, supra note 76.
184 Statement of Harry Rosenfield for the Ad Hoc Committee 1965 Hearings at 1045,
"We (compromised) only on the basis of an iron bound assurance."
185 The situation includes certain notable similarities to that of Professor X.
186 Wihtol v. Crow, supra note 76.
187 Id. at 686. ". . . Wihtol, in an obvious attempt to gain the sympathy of the court,
testified with tears . . . concerning . . . his wife and little child . . . (he had no child
and was separated from his wife) ... the court was not impressed with the sincerity
of Wihtol's testimony."
188 Id. at 684. "Plaintiffs well knew criminal sanctions required a willful infringe-
ment for profit."
189 Id. at 685.
190 Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., supra note 6.
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And concluded that:
The use of the new arrangement by the school and the church
choirs on one occasion was not an infringement.' 91
The Eighth Circuit balancing the equities without benefit of plain-
tiff's tears found different weights. 192 Said the court:
Whatever may be thought of Wihtol, the song in suit is a copy-
righted production, which the plaintiff can protect and defend
against all infringements, intentional or otherwise.
193
"Obviously," the court continued, "the plaintiffs had the exclu-
sive right to copy their copyrighted song and obviously Nelson E.
Crow had no right whatever to copy it." 194 (Emphasis added.)
Whatever may be the breadth of the doctrine of "fair use" it is
not conceivable to us that the copying of all, or substantially all, of
a copyrighted song can be held to be a "fair use" merely because the
infringer had no intent to infringe. 9 '
Obviously the court has no special sympathy for Crow as an educa-
tor. It sees him standing in the position of any other infringer. It, in
fact, asks us to note the decision for the plaintiff in the prior case of
Wihtol v. Wells.196 The court fails to mention that defendant Wells, dba
Evangel Music Company, published and sold a book in which he included
plaintiff's copyrighted song without permission. Application of the com-
mercial competition or purpose test would itself have swung the balance
away from such a defendant.
"It must be kept in mind," remonstrates the court after citing Wells,
"that the applicable law is purely statutory and that the copyrighted act
has little elasticity or flexibility," but fair use is flexible, we might reply
and application of the test of fair use should put Crow and Wells in dif-
ferent positions.
The educator has little to cheer him in this decision. While the
property rights of the author are emphatically brought out, the court
nowhere mentions the purpose clause of Article I, Section 8 of the
United States Constitution. The educator is perhaps justified in believ-
ing that although past courts and the authors and publishers themselves
have given lip service to the special position of the educator, it is, in fact,
only lip service. In any case, the fact is, that in the first case squarely on
point, the classroom teacher who copied for his class, lost.
Section 504C (2) (referred to above) provides that if defendant is
an instructor in a non-profit educational institution; if he copied for use
in the course of face to face teaching in a classroom, or similar place,
191 Wihtol v. Crow, supra note 76 at 684.
192 Ibid.
193 Id. at 782.
194 Id. at 780.
195 Ibid.
196 231 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1956).
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normally devoted to instruction; and if he believed or had reasonable
grounds to believe that his use was fair under § 107 (fair use), the court
has discretion to remit damages although he has, in fact, infringed.
Would the teacher in light of Wihtol's clear statement that his use is
not fair have reasonable grounds to believe-or is he required only to
look at the criteria spelled out? Is he protected if it would seem to a
reasonably prudent teacher in like or similar circumstances that this use
was a fair one according to the statutes? This would seem the proper
view if anything is to be accomplished. Perhaps the criteria are included
only as guidelines for the user, and the court, having an understanding,
of the law, can lay them aside to balance the equities with a simple: Is
this fair?
A word about the crime of infringement is necessary for a complete
picture of the confusion which reigns. While § 504 attempts to deposit
the unwitting teacher in safe water, § 506 carries him in the opposite
direction. Old § 104, Willful Infringement for Profit contains the follow-
ing proviso:
That nothing in this title shall be so construed as to prevent the
performance of religious or secular works . . . by public schools,
church choir ... provided the performance is given for charitable or
educational purposes and not for profit.197
New § 506 (a) provides as follows:
Any person who infringes a copyright willfully and for pur-
poses of commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be fined
... or imprisoned . .. or both....
No comment is necessary.
Conclusion
It should be evident that we cannot say with certainty that poor
Professor X would fare better under the proposed new revisions than he
will under the present law. Fair use is still fair and very clearly not an
infringement. De minimis is not a defense peculiar to copyright and is
nowhere mentioned in any version of Title 17. The fact that the original
is in the public domain is now easier to define and still a good defense:
innocent intent never has been. But innocence, will by specific exemp-
tion, save the teacher, in his classroom, from the payment of damages.
Thus we cannot measure how much of a work may be copied or how
many copies of parts of a work may be made. Each case, as it always has
in theory, must be tried on its own merits in light of the circumstances
surrounding it. These must include the prospective harm to the author,
the state of mind of the copier, and the benefit to education. All in the
light of the real reason for copyright in this country: to benefit the arts
and sciences by encouraging the author and scholar to produce.
197 The current law lists maximum fines to infringers without knowledge in certain
areas such as newspaper reproduction.
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